Nietzsche as endorsing certain substantive values, and further take Nietzsche as insisting that these values be somehow instituted or enacted politically; those adopting this strategy typically do so in order to criticize Nietzsche for advocating such a politics. Another strategy is to identify commitments of Nietzsche's that, although they ran aground in Nietzsche's person, implicitly furnish the core of an emancipatory or progressive politics.
3 These commentators are more sympathetic to Nietzsche than the previous set, but nevertheless disagree with Nietzsche's personal views. Accordingly they need to argue that confusions concealed his important insights; essential to this strategy is, on one hand, arguing for the force of some philosophic position, and on the other hand sifting that position out from Nietzsche's idiosyncratic beliefs.
Alternately, one could insist that Nietzsche's antagonism to politics is in fact an agonal politics, revisionist but recognizable, once properly understood. 4 This strategy, that is, on its own account requires only one instance of brute hermeneutic force: that of reinterpreting 'antipolitics' as opposition to politics in a conventional sense, not to the whole sphere of politics properly considered.
These are valuable projects, most of which are worth consideration in their particular
instantiations. But what I wish to argue here is that what they hold in common, that Nietzsche had a distinctly political orientation, should be rejected. I do not claim that Nietzsche's antipolitical stance is somehow the one incontestable interpretandum in Nietzsche and thus demands a proper reckoning. Nor do I proceed by identifying all the elements of politics and then accounting for which ones did or did not find Nietzsche's disfavor, thereby providing the data for a reckoning against politics. 5 My procedure, instead, is to clarify the grounds of Nietzsche's anti-political stance. I hope to show that anti-politics can function as a prism though which we can, on one hand, view fundamental features of Nietzsche's outlook, and on the other hand, at least consider how different Nietzsche's position is from what we might otherwise be apt to recognize it as. The argument of the paper is that Nietzsche's anti-political stance is rooted in his account of contingency in human identity and the appropriate orientation to this contingency.
Nietzsche argues that one basic orientation to human contingency, which I refer to as 'tragicomic,' is superior to all others, and further that no modern form of political life could manifest this orientation. No form of sociality available to us even prospectively can both satisfy the demands of politics and respond to the human condition in a way that is productive of the meanings that sustain our agency.
I. Contingency
One of the many features of Nietzsche's thought that generates confusion is his insistence on both of the following. One, human beings are capable of moments of spontaneous, selfexpressive, thoroughly novel creativity and invention; this inventiveness extends even to the existential matter of what it means to be human. Two, human beings are, as pieces of nature (BGE 9; cf. EH CW 2, RWB 6), pieces of fatefulness (TI 6.8; cf. TI 5.6) , and, more recently, pieces of culture, thoroughly determined by causes that lie outside of individual volition. This duality of human existence in Nietzsche's thought can of course lead one to focus on one side to the exclusion of the other, or on the apparent contradiction. Nietzsche, however, not only insists on both sides of the duality, but also deems it critical to offer an account of the relation between the two. According to Nietzsche, our spontaneous powers are not only conditioned by various determinations, but they also depend on them, so much so that the possibility of these powers is contingent upon being embodied, having a claim to a history or histories, and belonging to a culture. 6 To some extent, the reverse is also true: human nature, the course of history, and the resistance to one's will, and so on. The ability to claim one's deeds as one's own and take responsibility for them depends on conditions that make one susceptible to 'fate'(GM II:2), as
Nietzsche would have it. 10 We can thus be neither purely spontaneous nor purely conditioned.
The possibility of agency, rather, is conditioned by our relationships with others and our own limitations, and for Nietzsche this places the implicit presence of failure even within success.
Contingency in its third dimension extends through ideals and agency to the self. For
Nietzsche, to have a human identity is to maintain a tension between ideal and actual, so that one's immediate characteristics do not exhaust what one is. Instead, our more ultimate concerns and potentialities contribute in a way that both exalts us and renders our identities susceptible to the destruction of those concerns and potentialities. 11 Since one's hopes and aspirations, and the distance of these from actual circumstances, constitute part of who one is, human identity is always vulnerable.
Distinguishing these three dimensions of human contingency is worthwhile because doing so permits a consideration of the distinct ways in which human existence is unalterable and at the same time unlimited. For just this reason, however, Nietzsche deems it important to see these dimensions as a single phenomenon: contingency does not merely imply that our values are parochial or that our powers are frail, but extends, through our value and our powers, to our very beings. From moment to moment many things make us what we are, and most of these things are arbitrary or insignificant. But through the direction of our striving some of these things can take on the significance that constitutes our identities. 12 In Nietzsche's picture, we make ourselves into persons by having ideal hopes and trying to work them out, even at the risk of fear, distress, frustrated desire, or failure. This presence of risk is why, on one hand, it is impossible really to know what one is before living one's life, 13 and why, on the other hand, the 'law of Life' promises doom: 'all great things perish through their own doing, through an act of self-sublimation: thus decrees the law of Life, the law of the necessary "self-overcoming" in the essence of Life'(GM III:27). Nietzsche recognizes no external authority with the power to give laws, but the legislating authority here is integral to agency: it comes from the reflexive character of self-overcoming activity. The 'necessary' character of self-overcoming implies that the indeterminacy in oneself is what allows for self-formative agency, which in the achievement of ideals ensures self-destruction. Contingency is thereby implicated in 'Life' itself, and for this reason repays some acknowledgement.
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II. Orientation
Contingency is a feature of human existence because we play a role in shaping our identities: what we are is neither simply determined nor invented in the absence of any constraint. The productive process that makes us what we are depends on maintaining a tension between human situatedness and human aspiration. Nietzsche insists, accordingly, that how one orients oneself to human contingency expresses 'what one is' in such a way that renders that orientation fundamental to ethical assessment in general. Contingency, that is, allows for a dimension of ethical assessment that transcends that of particular value commitments and instead 6 concerns the sustainability of one's relation to one's values and oneself. In this section I review the basic orientations to contingency that Nietzsche identifies and his assessments of them.
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Nietzsche levels a variety of criticisms against each of the orientations, but his basic position is that the orientation that I refer to as 'tragicomic' is superior to the others because, by sustaining of a gap between possibility and aspiration, it best contributes to the possibility of agency and thereby to what Nietzsche calls 'Life.'
Nietzsche classifies possible orientations to human contingency in two main categories, each of which has two component sub-categories. One main category is the Prudential. The orientations in this category share an acknowledgement of contingency and hold that the proper response to the gap between possibility and aspiration is to derive an appropriate strategy so as to further one's ends more effectively. Contingency, in this view, imparts the lesson that one cannot have, achieve, or be everything that one might want, so one should learn how best to adjust one's means and aspirations so as to produce the optimal result.
There are two sub-categories of the Prudential, Realism and Idealism, 16 that differ according to the priority they give to adjusting means or adjusting aspirations. In Realism, one should eliminate one's aspirations and replace them with attainable ends. The acknowledgement of contingency provokes a change in ideals. Since the aspired ideal cannot be realized, it is not worth pursuing; instead one should restrict oneself to feasible pursuits. In Idealism, by contrast, one should identify the means to overcome contingency and close the gap between possibility and aspiration. In this case, the confrontation between circumstance and ideal only leads to a search for better and better ways to approach the ideal, despite the shortcoming of any available means. The remaining main category is the Ironic. The orientations that fall under this category both involves responses to contingency in which one takes distance from oneself and one's ideals: "irony" here refers to a stance in which one both maintains one's commitments and at the same time sees them as possibly accidental or alterable and thus as separate from one's identity.
This orientation thus requires holding one's personal integrity, although just as vulnerable to contingency, as separate from one's commitments. Contingency, in this view, thus obviates a full identification of oneself with the basic commitments and purposes of one's life. But it does not, however, compel adopting a revised purposiveness, as the allocation of purposes remains under first-person authority rather than simply abdicated to fate.
There are two subcategories of the Ironic, Despair and Tragicomedy, that differ according to the effect self-distance has on active engagement in one's life. In Despair, the ironic selfdistance is provided by the abandonment of any hope in realizing one's aspirations. The recognition of contingency leads to giving up any belief in the efficacy of one's actions; the selfdistance is then compelled by reflection on the ultimate futility of all that one does. In Tragicomedy, by contrast, one maintains a sense of one's contingency and the futility of ideals and nevertheless actively sustains one's aspirations. This orientation requires an unusual degree of self-consciousness: here human agency is seen as so powerfully ineffectual (or self-destructive) in confrontation with ideal hopes that there is something laughable about this condition. Ironic self-distance, on this orientation, enables one to maintain one's commitments in spite of this recognition of contingency.
The Ironic is superior to the Prudential because it accommodates the processes needed to sustain agency. Contingency does not reveal itself, for Nietzsche, as a single phenomenon, but in a number of processes that shape and structure human experience. Nietzsche identifies processes, for example, in terms of 'the great economy of the whole'(EH 'destiny' 4; cf. NCW epilogue), 'the necessity of error'(BT VS 5), 21 'the pains of betrayal'(HH I.629), 'the ever new appearance of the teachers of the purpose of existence'(GS 1), and 'the value of having enemies'(TI 5.3). In each of these processes, commitments become contentful through opposition and resistance. What might otherwise seem to be misfortune thus turns out, when seen from an appropriate distance, to be indispensable for ideals to be meaningful. The very costliness of our ideal commitments gives them significance, and thereby imparts to our activity some measure of distinction. Our activity takes its shape, Nietzsche suggests, by facing a tension between the actual and the ideal; 22 only in this way is our activity recognizable as such. We make sense of ourselves, in turn, through our activity.
The ironic orientations accommodate the dynamics of these processes: they acknowledge the constitutive role of opposition and failure in human existence and at the same time sustain ideals as at least potential candidates for commitment. 23 The self-separation of irony enables one to go forward in the face of contingency without trying, per impossibile, to change it. The prudential orientations, by contrast, oppose or minimize contingency, and thereby attempt to circumvent the processes of our self-constitution. Their proposed collapse of the actual and the ideal deprives these processes of the dynamic that makes them productive. Prudence is accordingly vacuous. It supplants the productive processes with ones that rely on our agency already being firmly established. As an orientation to contingency it thus either contributes nothing to life or at most makes of life something as meaningful as a joke that has already been told over and over again.
Within the Ironic, the Tragicomic orientation is superior to Despair. This, I hope, does not require a lengthy explanation, but it is worth pointing out that Despair is still superior to the Prudential orientations: it represents a meaningful engagement with life, even if a frustrated or paradoxical one. Even Despair is not a complete abdication to contingency, since it presupposes
firm commitments about what is important. In Despair, one sustains the integrity of one's own standpoint, even without the hope of effecting anything important.
The ironic orientations are superior because they carry with them impossible hopes, and we need impossible hopes to sustain our agency. These hopes are needed not because they promise any chance of fulfillment, but because without them the gap between real and ideal, in which we live, closes down. Irony promises at best only partial, conditional successes, but is meaningful in a way that prudence cannot be.
III. Politics
The preceding discussion aimed to show that, for Nietzsche, an Ironic orientation to contingency is needed to sustain agency. The argument of the present section is that politics is not congenial to the Ironic and is therefore vacuous, in that it is not independently productive of the meanings that shape human identity. Modern politics must manifest a predominantly Prudential orientation and therefore serve as useful rather than as meaningful. This is of course at least instrumentally valuable, but becomes problematic when mistaken for something more fundamental.
In Nietzsche's view, modern politics must have a Prudential orientation and for this reason is vacuous. It matters little to him which one whether politics is Idealist or Realist: in either case, politics acquiesces to practical imperatives. Politics is the art of the possible, and as such favors feasibility over what is true or right. These latter norms are dispensable in the functioning of social organizations, and indeed any such normative commitment seems to be tenuous within the political sphere. Politics, then elides something of interest to Nietzsche: the values and commitments that play no useful role in public life. And Nietzsche sees modern politics as a 'movement'-based effort to bring a diversity of people into enough consistency as to minimize conflict, thereby further separating politics from the potential for being interesting.
There are at least three basic features of modern politics that thus lead it to a Prudential orientation. One is its form of discursiveness: politics speaks the language of prudence. 24 Irony, of course, has its discourse, too. One could have a public discourse about social life that was sardonic, resigned, qualified, fanciful, enigmatic, and cautious. But political discourse is at least supposed to be transparent. Of course it does not function in this way; it might not even be able to function in this way, if its prudential function clashes with its prudential content, promising prosperity, security, strength, and so on. Political discourse is also of course liable to manipulation. But even such manipulation depends on its primary role as an undistorted medium for communication. Politics makes discourse something functional, and thereby restricts its possibilities: since it provides a forum for common deliberation, it must be exhaustively comprehensible. 25 an older model of competition in which the struggle is primarily positional: the stakes in conflict are taken as significant, so what needs to be settled is who counts as the better. 27 The ancient Greek agon, for example, in part constitutes the relevant value; competition is then desirable because it gives access to a kind of worth that would not otherwise exist. In political competition by contrast, we expect ideals to be abjured as part of the competition, and the result accordingly does not reveal position with respect to something significant, but is instead part of a process of policy determination. 28 No one ever thinks that the winner of a political contest is better for having won -at most it shows that the winner is a better candidate, or simply received more votes (and maybe not even that). The process is not constituted in a way to reveal anything about merit, but to produce an acceptable outcome and thereby to put an end to conflict.
Competition in its Prudential form solves a problem rather than presents an opportunity.
The feature of modern politics that perhaps most demands a prudential orientation, however, is its connection to the administration of public institutions. 29 Since politics is, among other things, the means by which we settle on the management of some of the more influential operations of our shared existence, it comes to seem important that politics conduct itself along prudent lines. 30 And because, in modern life, public institutions do have such prevalent and powerful effects, they tend to concern themselves with more urgent and more general needs, rather than with 'higher' things. Nietzsche is not claiming that they should do otherwise; one would hardly want one's pension plan to be administered according to a tragic sense of life, let alone the basic institutions of society. But politics is burdened by this Prudential responsibility.
Playing this role limits how it can be employed. Nietzsche denies is that there is any independent significance to be taken from the institutional arrangements. The effectiveness of politics, rather, is subordinate to the significance of social life.
Nietzsche does not even deny that politics can play an indirect role in the social phenomena that do have significance (see, e.g., BGE 61). For example, one can imagine both that institutional arrangements play a role in the cultivation of ressentiment and other reactive sentiments, and that it would be better to have a social life free from these sentiments. In this case, politics not only produces a particular effect, but it is also involved, through social interactions, in the shaping of the human soul. Nietzsche is certainly not committed to claiming either that the prevalence of ressentiment is unimportant, or that the organization of the political world does not bear on this. But he can claim here that the psychodynamics of self are of primary importance, and that the workings of political interactions with that psychodynamics is only derivatively so.
In identifying the vacuity of politics, Nietzsche is not even denying that politics is selfexpressive (see, e.g., BGE 202). That is, the political institutions that we have or are capable of express something about who we are. One famous example of this is Nietzsche's claim, 'it would not be unthinkable for a society to have such a consciousness of power as to allow itself the noblest luxury that it could have -leaving those who harm it unpunished'(GM II:10). In this case, a matter of public policy reveals something deep about the character of the society, or at least the character it aspires to have. This hypothetical society would then even have reasons, supported by practical necessity, to give expression to themselves through their institutions. For them it cannot be arbitrary how they treat violators of the public order, but rather it would be a matter of living in a way that is true to their own self-understanding. But social life rather than political institutions are primary here: the policy only matters in virtue of the social identity it expresses.
There are two options for trying to recuperate the significance of politics, but neither are promising. One is to concede that politics is Prudential but to insist that this could be reconciled with the Ironic. Politics, in this approach, becomes a means of reconciling two incompatible sides to one another: on one side there is conflict, self-subversion, and open-endedness, and on the other side the rational, mutual inclusiveness that is needed for there to be social order. Some dialogical or deliberative model of intersubjective dynamics then stands as the tertium quid that reconciles, or at least mediates between, these two sides. This remains a form of the Prudential, however: it promises a way to accommodate conflict and thereby provide a solution to the difficulties of social existence.
The other option is to abandon the Prudential altogether and insist on a purely Ironicmost likely tragic -politics. Here the difficulty is not merely to imagine a politics open to selfdestruction, discursively enigmatic, that seeks human identity in public offices, or that can laugh at human failings and not try to fix them. All of that is conceivable. The problem here is that placing the burdens of the Ironic on our public life limits the Ironic. It has turned out, Nietzsche suggests, that the Ironic is far less productive when it is carried out at the level of public life than when public life supports private engagements with Irony. This is why Nietzsche came to think of politics in light of its modern form, as concerned with the administration of institutions, rather than in its classical form, as concerned with the shape of the best human life. In his early essay 'The Greek State,' Nietzsche suggests that it was formerly possible to have a substantive politics, one that was deeply meaningful for all its participants. Politics then could be organized around promoting conflict and competition, so as to make it possible, in general and in various specific domains, for someone to be the best. 31 But the cost of this was 'the unconditional sacrifice of all other interests to the service of the states-instinct'(KSA I:771) Tragic politics, that is, required a particular kind of social unanimity: it required everyone to identify the significance of their own lives with that of the polis. This is not only permanently unavailable to us now, but also undesirable. With tragic individualism, perhaps, or tragic diversity, the vacuous discourses about managing affairs and containing conflict make it possible for there to be more private, intense, 'spiritual' conflict. For these reasons, public life needs a prudent discourse which does not intrinsically matter but which is necessary for ironic possibilities. So Nietzsche's aim is not to replace our currently vacuous discourse with a more meaningful one, but to try to separate off politics from the rest of life.
Nietzsche's 'anti-politics' thus involves what we might call a 'liberalism of strength': 32 one that is not based on metaphysical claims about universal human dignity or rationalist claims about the possibility of adopting a fully neutral procedure for adjudicating disputes. Nietzsche's position functions as a form of liberalism, since the role of the state is restricted for the sake of free self-development. The point of this restriction, however, is not to acknowledge inherent human worth, but to promote conflict in a manner that is productive of the meanings that sustain our senses of self. Nietzsche insists that we need a split between the Ironic and the way our shared existence is administered, so that some conflicts can be irresolvable without this being an urgent matter.
According to Nietzsche's anti-politics, then, we need to adopt a Prudential orientation to support our Ironic possibilities. What makes this anti-political is that it refuses both to envision a return to a tragic form of social existence and, in the absence of such a tragic social existence, to seek ourselves within the political. Anti-politics insists that either operation would misplace the importance of the political and thereby interfere with more productive possibilities for human life.
